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Abstract 
 
 
China and Pakistan share what is widely known as an ‘all weather friendship’. The 
historical roots of this friendship can be traced to 1963, when the two countries entered 
into a border agreement that divided territory in Pakistan-administered-Kashmir. Since 
then, China has provided missile and nuclear technology to Pakistan. It has limited the 
potential for escalation in the time of war between India and Pakistan and is the largest 
economic investor in Pakistan. The benefits of this friendship for Pakistan are clear. Yet, 
there is little detail on what led to the making of the ‘all weather friendship’. This article 
provides a detailed account of Sino-Pakistani relations between 1949 and 1963. It argues 
that whilst the 1963 agreement led to a turning point, the Pakistani establishment – 
military and civilian – sought to engage China since 1949. They did so to create strategic 
options for themselves in the event that the US and the UK – Pakistan’s main allies 
following independence – limited or worse, ended their support for Pakistan in its 
troubled relations with India. This article is based on primary sources available in the US, 
Britain, as well as recently declassified and hitherto unused papers in India.    
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The Making of an ‘All Weather Friendship’ 
Pakistan, China, and the History of a Border Agreement: 1949 to 19631  
 
Rudra Chaudhuri 
 
 
On 2 March 1963, Pakistan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) formally entered 
into a border agreement. 3,400 square miles of disputed territory along the Karakoram 
Mountain Range – straddling the borders of China, India and Pakistan – was delimited. 
As a note to the British Joint Intelligence Committee put it immediately after the signing 
ceremony in Peking, negotiations had been timed to ‘embarrass India and put the 
greatest strain on Indo-Pakistan relations.’2 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
reached the same conclusion. ‘Pakistan was motivated’, a report underlined, ‘by a desire 
to embarrass India.’3After all, a part of the territory under discussion was in what the 
CIA often referred to as ‘Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.’4 It led to a furiously worded 
protest by the Indian government. This was, according to Indian officials, disputed 
territory in what they referred to as ‘Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.’5 Riling Indians more was 
the fact that the border agreement was signed shortly after India was defeated in war by 
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The Sino-Indian Border War, as the 1962 conflict 
came to be known broke-out on 20 October and ended with a unilateral ceasefire called 
by the PLA a month later on 21 November.6  
 
Further, it was signed a fortnight before Indian and Pakistani leaders were to begin a 
fourth round of talks on Kashmir in Calcutta. India was pressured into talks by the US 
President John F. Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan on Pakistan’s 
beckoning.7 A settlement on Kashmir, Kennedy and Macmillan were led to believe, was 
the only way in which they could justify providing additional military assistance to India – 
to deter further Chinese incursions – whilst convincing Pakistani President Ayub Khan 
to remain loyal to a set of western backed military alliances to which he and his 
predecessors once committed their nation’s fate.8 The timing notwithstanding, the 
territorial agreement with China served to establish the founding basis of what is often 
referred to as an ‘all weather friendship.’ As Chen Yi, the Chinese Minister for Foreign 
Affairs stated at the banquet to celebrate the signing of the March agreement, it marked, 
he fervently argued, a ‘new stage in the development of friendly relations between China 
and Pakistan.’9  
 
In a carefully worded interview to the Associated Press of Pakistan, Chinese Premier Zhou 
Enlai underlined that whilst Pakistan ‘will make more and more friends’ in parts of the 
world beyond those closely attached to the Anglo-Western network of alliances, ‘India 
will become more and more isolated.’10 Even a cursory reading of the history of the last 
half-century does little service to Zhou’s estimation.11 Nonetheless, it should not take 
away from the fact that this period in Pakistani history provided a degree of choice to its 
leaders both tired and disillusioned by what they believed was the west’s’ inherent 
fascination with India. Yet, curiously, this crucial period in Sino-Pakistani history has 
been understudied. Essential questions have been left unanswered. For instance, what 
exactly led to the eventual border agreement between Pakistan and China? Was it really 
an opportunity seized by both China and Pakistan at a time India was found licking her 
wounds following military defeat? How exactly did the negotiations proceed? Finally, has 
this ‘friendship’ benefited Pakistan in times of crisis? 
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Existing accounts provide little by way of detail on Pakistan’s relations with China in this 
time. In fact, whether it is first-hand accounts authored by a cast of actors who 
participated in the crisis or historical works on the same,12 these questions are left under-
examined. For the most part, and in line with the intelligence reports distributed during 
the Sino-Indian crisis, scholars argue that Pakistan entered these negotiations in May 
1962 to indeed embarrass India.13 The border agreement, they contend, was in turn a 
result of Pakistan’s frustration with President Kennedy’s decision to provide military 
assistance to India during its war with China. In short, existing accounts narrate only a 
part of the story of the making of the ‘all weather friendship’. They do so largely by 
focussing on the period between 1962 and 1963. This article provides a more complete 
account. It argues that whilst the Border War in 1962 provided Ayub with a strategic 
opportunity he was more than willing to take advantage of, the process of engaging 
China started well before war broke out in 1962. Further, the agreement itself can 
scarcely be explained away as a result of increased American assistance to India. Pakistani 
leaders – and not just Ayub – sought to create a balance in Pakistani foreign policy soon 
after the creation of the PRC in October 1949.  
 
This is not to say that a diplomatic advance in favour of China was either seamless or 
pre-destined, but that Pakistani leaders had always desired a closer working relationship 
with a nation they knew they would need as much as they needed the US or the west 
more generally. In sum, this article provides a more complete account of how Pakistan 
slowly but surely negotiated an advance that immediately turned into something more 
strategic as the final signatures were added to its only border agreement till date. The ‘all 
weather friendship’ provided and continues to provide Pakistani leaders with a degree of 
choice in making crucial decisions. As Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the youngest Minister in 
Ayub’s Cabinet put it: Pakistan’s relations with China are ‘an independent factor in our 
[it’s] foreign policy, and not contingent on any other.’14 Essentially, this ‘independent’ 
relationship has since aided Pakistan in building a nuclear arsenal, offered financial 
assistance when the US and the UK have been unable to, and as importantly, provided 
both the Generals and politicians in Pakistan with a valuable friend that India has not 
been able to altogether ignore at the time of war with her western neighbour.15  
 
The article is divided into four parts. The first provides a short note on sources used for 
this study and the limitations thereof. The second looks at Sino-Pakistani relations from 
the time of the birth of the PRC to 1960, when Pakistan seriously considered voting for 
China’s admission to the United Nations (UN). The third focuses on the period between 
1960-63, carefully examining Pakistani motivations and actions before, during and after 
the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War. The fourth and last section looks briefly at the 
significance of the ‘all weather friendship’ in times of war and peace in the post 1963 
period.  
 
 
Sources  
 
What significantly impairs any serious historical work on Pakistan is the lack of access to 
Pakistani public archives and private papers. Some scholars claim to have had sight of 
papers deposited in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Army’s General 
Headquarters (GHQ).16 These accounts however cannot be crosschecked. Further, the 
secondary literature on this period is scant at best.17 Most accounts published in the first 
two decades following Pakistani independence or shortly after summarise and analyse 
news reports and public utterances. Valuable in themselves, they provide little by way of 
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detail.18 Memoirs and diary-like narratives authored by Pakistani leaders are available but 
need to be read with caution. For instance, Ayub’s autobiography –authored whilst he 
was still in office– and delicately titled ‘Friends not Masters’ offers a great deal by way of 
insight into the Field Marshal’s thinking, but these were thoughts tailored primarily for a 
western public less and less enchanted by Pakistan.19 The monograph was completed in 
1967 and published a year later, providing little distance from the potential entrapments 
of political expediency. In short, it reflects a well rehearsed public line that can hardly be 
taken at face value.  
 
With these limitations in mind, this article uses three sets of sources. First, it examines 
the limited secondary material and a whole range of memoirs authored by a cast of actors 
present at the time. Second, it cross-references these accounts with edited and published 
primary material. The most important of these include a collection of ‘British Papers’ 
edited by a former Pakistani bureaucrat and select volumes of the Foreign Relations of the 
United States (FRUS): an almost essential and easily accessible compilation of primary 
documents.20 Importantly, the article uses recently published volumes of the Selected 
Works of Jawaharlal Nehru,21 a treasure trove that is publicly available but not extensively 
used. Third, and most importantly, it surveys unpublished papers in the British, and 
American National Archives, and recently declassified and hitherto unused papers in the 
Indian National Archives. Further, the article makes selective use of private papers 
deposited at Churchill College in Cambridge and the Nehru Memorial Museum and 
Library (NMML) in New Delhi. What follows is a more complete account of how 
Pakistan –and Ayub in particular– befriended a nation that has become its largest 
economic investor and supplier of nuclear materials in the present day.22 Moreover, it 
critically analyses the impact the ‘all weather friendship’ had on Pakistan’s relations with 
the US – it’s ally– and in it’s troubled relationship with India.  
 
 
1. Troubled Road to Negotiations: 1949 to 1960 
 
 
The commemorative article of the People’s Daily in February 1951 –widely recognised as 
an organ of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)– made a 
special mention of the ‘friendship which already exists between the peoples’ of India and 
China.23 India was one of the first non-communist countries to recognise the PRC in 
December 1949. What helped, at least in the initial years following communist victory in 
the civil war was that Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru genuinely believed that the 
PRC deserved a seat in the UN Security Council, replacing Nationalist China.24 Further, 
Nehru was acutely aware that ‘isolation from outside contacts’ added a strong element of 
‘fear and suspicion’ in Mao’s China.25 Overcoming this sort of xenophobia required 
engagement and international recognition of the Communist regime, a task the Prime 
Minister set out to realise –although unsuccessfully– following the outbreak of war in 
Korea.26 In turn and as Odd Arne Westad points out, covert Sino-Soviet foreign policy 
planning after Stalin outlined the need for China to work with nationalist nations like 
Nehru’s India and Sukarno’s Indonesia.27  
 
These compulsions were altogether absent when it came to Pakistan. After all, Nehru 
and not Mohammad Ali Jinnah –the founder of Pakistan and its first Governor General 
– was the key spokesman in matters to do with foreign affairs prior to Indian and 
Pakistani independence. It was Nehru who travelled to international conferences meeting 
representatives sympathetic to Mao’s cause. Nehru even travelled to China –where he 
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was when the Second World War broke out in 1939– after which he strongly opposed 
Japanese imperialism.28 Amongst Indian nationalists, he was best positioned to take the 
lead on such matters following independence.  
 
This did not however mean that the relatively new bureaucratic landscape in communist 
Peking ignored Pakistan or vice-versa. Pakistan too recognised China early on 4 January, 
1950. According to an official communiqué issued on 24 January, it had ‘withdrawn 
recognition from [the] Guomindang (GMD) government stationed in Taiwan.’29 In 
September of the same year, Mohammad Zafarullah Khan –Pakistan’s first Foreign 
Minister– advocated China’s right to be ‘represented in the United Nations’ on the floor 
of the General Assembly.30 Formal diplomatic relations were established in April 1951. 
By June, the PRC’s first Charge de Affairs arrived in Karachi, the Pakistani capital till 
1967.31 Ambassadors were formally exchanged in November. In fact, by the time the 
Chinese ambassador designate –Han Nianying– presented his credentials in Karachi both 
countries had worked swiftly to establish a Pakistan-China Friendship Society. An official 
invitation was also extended to Pakistan on behalf of Zhou Enlai to attend the Second 
anniversary of the People’s Republic.32 India under Nehru might have been the likely 
choice for partnership in the very early years of the PRC, but this certainly did not mean 
that the soon-to-be Islamic Republic was naturally disadvantaged.33 That the PRC would 
be a significant actor in South Asia was recognised immediately by both India and 
Pakistan.  
 
1.1. Balancing Treaty Obligat ions  
 
These fast moving diplomatic exchanges between China and Pakistan did not go 
unnoticed. As one cable from the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) in London 
bluntly put it, ‘the large new Chinese embassy in Karachi is getting down to work.’ 
British diplomats were convinced that Pakistan was looking to forge a closer relationship 
with China.34 The timing was moot. India at the time was struggling to balance its own 
relations between the US, the Soviet Union, and the PRC in its role as an active 
participant in negotiating an end to the War in Korea.35 This exercise left Nehru with 
little goodwill in Peking. Pakistan on the other hand and as British officials confirm, 
understood this to be an opportunity to be exploited.36 China too was looking for an 
opening with Pakistan.  
 
To be sure, the decision by the government of British Prime Minister Clement Attlee to 
first oppose and then –because of American pressure– support a ban on oil exports to 
China rattled officials in Peking.37 At a time when a young PRC was increasingly isolated, 
establishing a working relationship with Pakistan was considered imperative. Yet, and till 
at least the First Afro-Asian conference in Bandung in 1955, mutual misgivings shaped a 
relationship that many years down the line would be referred to as ‘the most stable and 
durable element of China’s foreign relations.’38 Prior to the establishment of the PRC, 
Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan estimated that communist control of China 
simply meant the ‘increasing control of Moscow.’39 That the Chinese ambassador in 1951 
was received in Karachi airport by Soviet and Czech officials was telling.40  
 
The extent to which newly communist China would support Moscow was also a concern 
given Russia’s increasing contacts with King Zahir Shah in Afghanistan. Soviet leaders 
Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin’s visit to Kabul in December 1953 was at the 
very least alarming. They announced support for ‘Pakhtoonistan’ or the establishment of 
a Pashtun nation,41 a term and idea that is all but abhorred by Pakistan’s civilian and 
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military leadership even in the present day. Further, and perhaps most important of all, 
Khwaja Nazimuddin and Mohammad Ali Bogra (Pakistan’s second and third Prime 
Ministers respectively) were acutely aware of the strategic need to tread cautiously when 
it came to Communist China. After all, Pakistan not only entered into a Mutual Defence 
pact with the US in 1954 but subsequently also joined western backed military alliances 
designed to contain and even fight Communist forces.42 Consequently, Pakistan’s initial 
and open support for the PRC’s admission to the UN was soon muted. Instead, Pakistani 
envoys chose to support US-led resolutions to postpone China’s representation in the 
UN. These were, in some respects, the very early stages of developing a balanced 
advance in Pakistan’s relations with the US and China.  
 
As mentioned above, the first noteworthy turning point in the relationship with China 
occurred in 1955 in Bandung, where Pakistani leaders attempted to balance their want to 
reach-out to China with their above-mentioned treaty obligations. To this end, Pakistan 
took the initiative to set the scene for what would turn out to be a critical summit in 
Indonesia. On 19 February 1955, Pakistani officials attended the inaugural meeting of 
what came to be called the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in Manila, 
along with other sponsoring nations including the US, the UK, and Australia. Astutely, 
and on that same day, the Pakistani ambassador in Peking met with Chinese officials. He 
unambiguously expressed Pakistan’s desire for closer relations.43 The need to work with 
the west in Manila was explained away as securing guarantees against Soviet –and not 
Chinese– expansion into parts of Asia.44  
 
Two months later in Bandung, Prime Minister Bogra made a clear distinction between 
China and the USSR, labelling the latter as ‘imperialist.’45 What raised Pakistan’s ire was 
the fact that Russia, which abstained from votes to do with Kashmir in the UN Security 
Council between 1949 and 1953, changed tact to support India’s case.46 In two private 
sessions at Bandung between Bogra and Zhou, the former once again assured the 
Chinese premier that Pakistan’s entry into military pacts sponsored principally by the US 
were not anti-Chinese.47 Bogra went as far as to tell Zhou that Pakistan would ‘never 
militarily participate’ in an attack against China. Much to Bogra’s surprise, Zhou went 
public with these assurances. It would seem that Bogra, who British officials believed was 
‘more understanding of motor cars and cameras than of politics’ was politically used by 
the likes of Zhou.48 The idea for Zhou, as later confirmed by Chinese officials, was to 
wean Pakistan slowly away from SEATO. Going public with Pakistani assurances at 
Bandung was meant to frustrate Pakistan’s relations with the US and the West more 
broadly.49 Chinese leaders like Marshall Ho Lung – one of the PRC’s ‘Ten Marshalls’ 
appointed in 1955, made it their mission to actively increase ‘the distance between the 
United States and Pakistan.’50 In this, Lung had the full support of the CCP.51 As much 
as Pakistan sought to engage China, Chinese leaders too grew interested in the potential 
offered by a nation considered as a foe by India.    
 
Following the private sessions in Bandung, Zhou’s statement in the political committee 
of the conference on 23 April was telling, and it is worth recounting in part. He said: 
 
‘The day before yesterday, after lunch, I paid a visit to the Prime Minister of 
Pakistan. He told me that although Pakistan was a party to a military treaty, 
Pakistan was not against China. Pakistan had no fear China would commit 
aggression against her. As a result of that, we achieved a mutual 
understanding although we are still against military treaties. The Prime 
Minister of Pakistan further assured that if the United States should take 
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aggressive action under the military treaty or if the United States launched a 
global war, Pakistan would not be involved in it.’52    
 
Zhou’s public announcement was, according to British sources, repeated by him in 
private to his own delegation. The bottom-line, according to these messengers was that 
‘Pakistan would never fight China.’53 This was, to an extent, a crucial moment in the 
development of Sino-Pakistani relations.  
 
In line with this newfound spirit of friendship, Pakistani Prime Minister Huseyn 
Suhrawardy visited China in October 1956. This was the first such visit by a senior leader 
since Pakistani independence. Selective accounts –notably by Suhrawardy’s own cousin– 
suggest that this was a game-changing trip.54 It carried a great deal of symbolic value –
followed in turn by Zhou’s state visit to Pakistan in December 1956. Chinese officials, 
according to Indian ‘sources’ in Karachi, argued that the visit was clearly designed to 
‘cultivate’ China and this, these ‘sources’ confirmed, ‘was all to the good’ as far as Zhou 
was concerned.55 Suhrawardy met twice with Mao and four times with Zhou. Much like 
Bogra in Bandung, the Pakistani Prime Minister did not hesitate to tell his hosts that 
Pakistan’s membership to SEATO was not aimed at China. Pakistan ‘entered into these 
alliances,’ Suhrawardy now argued, ‘because of the fear of India.’56 
 
Further, the visit had much to do with the need to secure Chinese support on Kashmir.57 
A disappointing set of exchanges with Nehru earlier in the year convinced Bogra that the 
Pakistani demand of holding a plebiscite in Kashmir was unlikely to attract either Indian 
or international (mainly American) attention.58 Khrushchev and Bulganin’s visit to India 
–and specifically to Kashmir– in 1955 made certain to both Bogra and Suhrawardy that 
Soviet support lay with India. Tellingly, and whilst in India, the Soviet leaders highlighted 
that ‘the Kashmiri question had already been solved by the Kashmiri people 
themselves.’59 There was no need for a plebiscite, a key Pakistani demand. In a meeting 
with both Bulganin and Khrushchev, Nehru did not hesitate to note that ‘he was grateful 
for the statements made by the Soviet leaders.’60 Predictably, these developments did 
little to entice Pakistan. Feeble attempts to turn Soviet opinion away from India had 
failed too.61  
 
It was at this time that the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs informally asked their 
counterparts in Peking to –for the first time– clarify China’s position on Kashmir. The 
answer was simple. For the time being, officials in Peking made clear; their view was not 
very different to that shared by the Soviet’s. However, the difference was that unlike their 
Soviet counterparts, Chinese officials refused to publicly air their position. This left 
Pakistan with a window of opportunity to change China’s disposition.62 Suhrawardy’s 
visit was to serve as the first major attempt at doing exactly this. The timing was ripe. 
China’s relations with India had become increasingly fractious. By 1956, Chinese maps, 
as Nehru nervously pointed out to his trusted advisors, began to show ‘parts of our 
[Indian] territory as being part of the Chinese state.’63 Further, a visit by the Dalai Lama 
to India in 1956 aggravated those like Zhou and other members of the CCP. Suhrawardy 
sought to take ‘full advantage of the situation.’64  
 
For their part, Indian officials were largely unaware of the slow but effective 
development of the Sino-Pakistani relationship. Officials were instead focussed on 
China’s cartographic representation of Eastern India as a part of China. The idea that 
China might in time find an ally in Pakistan was considered somewhat far-fetched.65 In 
fact, for India, Bandung was hailed as a grand success. ‘China,’ according to the then 
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Indian Foreign Secretary –Subimal Dutt– ‘showed herself reasonable and 
accommodating.’ An eight-page note drafted by Dutt after the conference said nothing 
about Sino-Pakistani cooperation.66 During talks with Bogra on the side-lines of the 
Commonwealth Relations Conference in London in July 1956, Nehru did not once 
mention China.67 By the end of 1956, Pakistani leaders were convinced that friendship 
with China offered strategic opportunities unfound in the relationship with either the US 
or the USSR. Suhrawardy was equally perturbed by the Eisenhower administration, 
which grew wary of playing the part of an arbiter between India and Pakistan. The 
following period between 1956 and 1960 was about Pakistan actively finding space 
between its treaty obligations within SEATO and its need for greater Chinese support. 
As the then Japanese ambassador to Pakistan relayed to his Indian counterpart in 
Karachi, the ‘flirtation with a rival’ – read China, ‘is the most effective way of exciting the 
jealousy or reinforcing the affection of one’s own friend,’ or the West. That Pakistan 
actively sought to balance its relations between the PRC and the US was noted by other 
Japanese diplomats who at the time understood China better than most.68  
 
Yet, it would be a while before the Bogra-Zhou exchange at Bandung and the 
Suhrawardy-Zhou visits would lead to anything concrete. A quick tilt towards China 
could lead to expulsion from an alliance system –SEATO– created to guard against 
‘communist aggression.’69 Further, whilst Chinese support on Kashmir mattered to 
officials like Suhrawardy, others in the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs were 
concerned about alienating America and Britain by swinging too openly in favour of 
China. They also reminded Suhrawardy that pressure from the west on India was far 
more valuable than that from China. Bureaucrats in Pakistan understood that their 
leaders’ immediate fascination with Zhou and Mao could in turn alienate those in the 
western alliance that had materially (by way of the transfer of military hardware) done 
more for Pakistan than China could or wanted to for the time being. In fact, the political 
benefits of working with the west, according to such officials, far outweighed an open tilt 
in favour of China. This point was brought home to Pakistani leaders following a 
SEATO meeting in Karachi in March 1956. In a Joint Communiqué, the eight signatories 
to the Treaty (including the US, the UK and Australia) highlighted the Kashmir dispute.70 
This enraged India, but did well to remind Pakistani leaders of the obvious advantages in 
remaining a willing partner inside SEATO.71 As for Mao and Zhou, they were both 
unconvinced that Pakistan’s civilian leadership had what it took to break with the west in 
favour of China.72 More importantly, Pakistan needed to reconcile its own position with 
regards to Tibet and Taiwan before the opening with China could be exploited to its full 
potential.     
 
1.2. Tibet ,  Taiwan, and an Offer    
 
On 27 October 1958, General Mohammad Ayub Khan removed President Iskander 
Mirza –who did away with the 1956 Pakistani constitution– from office in what was 
largely a bloodless coup. Ayub joined the Indian army in 1928, and notably, is the only 
Pathan to have held the highest office within the Pakistani Army. He was not someone of 
the ‘highest intellectual class’, as those who knew him confessed,73 but was astute enough 
to explore strategic opportunities with China. China too was keen to work with a new 
leader. In fact, towards the end of Suhrawardy’s reign, Mao was convinced that he ‘was a 
stooge of the western powers.’74 Ayub on the other hand exuded confidence. He made 
clear from the outset that his regime wanted ‘to draw closer to [the] Commonwealth and 
the west generally,’ but also explored possibilities with Peking more aggressively than 
before.75 At first however, disagreements over the fate of Tibet and a tentative 
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rapprochement offered to the GMD-run government in Taiwan would do little to realise 
such possibilities.    
 
On 22 September 1958, in the midst of the Second Taiwan Straights Crisis that pitted 
Mainland China and Taiwan in a military conflict, a note from Peking demanded that 
Pakistan clarify its position. A week later, the Pakistani Foreign Affairs Ministry 
cautiously replied. Pakistan, it argued, ‘had neither given de facto or de jure recognition to 
the government in Taiwan.’ ‘The juridical position,’ the note stated, ‘of Formosa is not 
clear.’ Hence, it concluded, the problem should be ‘settled by peaceful negotiations.’76 
Apart from the ambiguously phrased note that did little to persuade officials in Peking, 
was that a little more than a year later Pakistan hosted what came to be called the 
‘Chinese Moslem Haji Mission.’ It was headed by one of Chiang Kai-Shek’s deputies. 
The mission was on its way to Mecca and had been met by the Pakistani Foreign 
Secretary as it disembarked in Karachi. Unsurprisingly, Zhou authorised a strongly 
worded protest note. It made clear that Pakistan’s ‘two China’ policy blatantly supported 
the US and SEATO position on Taiwan.’ ‘By continuing to do so,’ it firmly stated, 
Pakistan would have to ‘bear full responsibility for all damage thus done to the Sino-
Pakistani relationship.’77  
 
As problematic as Pakistan’s stand on Taiwan was her position with regards to Tibet. 
Following the rebellion in Lhasa in March 1959, Pakistan adopted a strident if not bold 
approach. On 20 October, having co-sponsored a draft resolution on Tibet, the Pakistani 
delegation at the UN feverishly argued that the ‘attempt to change the traditional way of 
life of the Tibetan people’ was essentially ‘a violation of their fundamental human rights.’ 
It strongly recommended garnering ‘world public opinion’ to assist Tibetan’s in their 
struggle.78 Ayub publicly stated that the ‘Chinese occupation of Tibet’ and other 
construction activities on its border with Afghanistan constituted a ‘threat’ that could not 
be ‘overlooked by wishful thinking.’ This was hardly, according to Zhou, how friendships 
developed.79 Unlike Bogra and Surawardy, Ayub was less interested in pleasing China as 
he was in convincing Chinese leaders that Pakistan was a nation that understood the 
importance of leverage in international politics.  
 
What also pushed Ayub into such tough talk was the fact that by September 1959, 
Chinese maps began showing parts of Pakistan’s north and north-eastern border regions 
as belonging to the PRC.80 These outlying territories had been a focus of the PLA from 
at least the beginning of 1953. An attempt by Pakistani paramilitary guards to mark the 
border was thwarted. As one British military advisor travelling in those parts recalled: the 
‘marks made were obliterated’ by the PLA, which had a post in the area.81 Ayub was 
convinced that the PRC would do what was necessary to occupy territory in Pakistan 
controlled Kashmir. Negotiations, according to him, were necessary. As he put it: ‘the 
sole purpose [of the border discussions] was to eliminate possible cause of conflict in the 
future.’82 Only a demarcation process, he told his advisors, could avoid further ‘friction’ 
in an area where Chinese patrols were regularly sighted.83 A strong note on Tibet at the 
UN, it would seem, was Ayub’s way of creating for Pakistan a degree of leverage to trade 
on the negotiating table with China.  
 
For Ayub, China needed to realise that it was dealing with an equal in the international 
domain. Curiously, on 23 October 1959, only three days after Pakistan’s raucous appeal 
at the UN, Ayub told his Cabinet that Pakistan and China would soon enter into talks to 
demarcate and delimit the border. Tibet was no longer a matter of discussion for 
Pakistani officials at the UN. Mao finally found a noteworthy counterpart in Pakistan. 
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However, unlike a few years before, this time China found it increasingly difficult to take 
advantage of the opening presented by Ayub.  Shocked and then occupied by the Dalai 
Lama’s escape –assisted by the CIA– to India in March 1959,84 the focus for Mao and 
most other Chinese leaders turned squarely on the problem with India.85 What irked the 
Chinese leadership more was that they suspected Indian support for US trained Tibetan 
insurgent fighter’s air dropped into Tibet to fight the PLA.86 The period between 1959 
and the end of 1960 saw little development in the Sino-Pakistani relationship. The stage 
had been set. The troubles around Tibet and Taiwan had been settled. Mao and Zhou 
found a formidable ally in Ayub. What was now needed was an impetus for both China 
and Pakistan to accommodate their respective strategic needs and realise a friendship that 
would outlast these leaders. 
 
2. An opportunity in War: 1960 to 1963 
 
Ayub Khan’s congratulatory letter –following the US presidential elections in November 
1960– to President John F. Kennedy was littered with hints groping for assurances. 
Aware of the incoming Democratic administrations stated aim to improve ties with 
‘neutrals’ like India, Ayub stressed that he and the ‘people of Pakistan’ were determined 
to keep the ‘godless creed’ of communism away from its borders. Instead, Ayub 
maintained that the ‘destiny’ of his country ‘lies in friendship with the United States.’ He 
did not fail to mention that it was hence in the ‘supreme interest of the west’ to sustain 
this friendship.87 In fact, what developed between 1960 and the fall of 1963 was 
engagement along parallel tracks: of gaining assurances from the west about their support 
for Pakistan over India and at the same time of exploring and then realising 
opportunities with China.  
 
2.1. A Deal 
 
The first real attempt to reach-out to China in this period came from a relatively younger 
member of Ayub’s Cabinet. Thirty-two years of age, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto led the Pakistani 
delegation to the fifteenth General Assembly in New York in October 1960. 
Unconvinced by the merits of supporting postponement motions in the case of China’s 
admission to the UN, Bhutto chose to abstain from the US sponsored resolution. 
Whether this was done with or without Ayub’s support is unclear. Indeed, Bhutto was 
mildly rebuked by Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir, who argued that for the time being 
and if forced to choose between China and the US, Pakistan had little option but to be 
‘friendly with the west.’88 The Foreign Ministry was less inclined to engage in a high 
stakes game especially at a time when the Kennedy administration seemed more 
convinced about the need to engage India. This notwithstanding, Bhutto opened the 
pathway for further negotiations with China. At some level, the tension between the 
Foreign Ministry’s desire to play-it-safe and remain squarely in the western quarter, and 
Bhutto and Ayub’s want to balance Pakistan’s advance in foreign policy by befriending 
China did well, at least for the time being, to check and then develop relations with both 
the US and China  
 
During visits to Washington, other members of the Cabinet remained ambiguous about 
Pakistan’s willingness to reach a settlement with Peking. In one meeting, Mohamed 
Shoaib –the Pakistani Finance Minister– laughed off the suggestion made by Kennedy 
that the opening with China was ‘only to bring pressure on India.’89 In fact, and at least in 
part, it was to bring pressure on the US and Kennedy in particular to actively support 
Pakistan’s case with regards to Kashmir at the UN. The Indian ambassador in 
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Washington –B. K. Nehru– was well aware of Pakistan’s game-play. In a whole series of 
correspondences between January 1961 and till the outbreak of war with China in 
October 1962, the younger ambassador was ordered by M. J. Desai –the Indian Foreign 
Secretary– to push-back any suggestion of an UN-led discussion on Kashmir. Instead, 
and as Prime Minister Nehru put it to Kennedy: ‘the only effective way of arriving at a 
mutually satisfactory solution,’ according to India at least, was to ‘follow the method of 
direct negotiations and discussions.’90 At the time, India was in a position to make such 
demands. There was little Kennedy could do but adhere to Nehru’s craftily worded 
disapproval. None of this was lost on Ayub.     
 
On a visit to Washington in July 1961 and increasingly aware of disagreements between 
Zhou and Nehru over the contested Sino-Indian border,91 Ayub continued to press 
Kennedy for assurances he had worked so hard for. Kennedy agreed to ‘talk with 
President Ayub first’ if America was to provide military assistance to India. Ayub 
shrewdly chose to stay clear of any discussion around Pakistan’s own border with China 
or Bhutto’s decision to abstain from the vote at the UN.92 At the same time, and aware 
of how his US visit might be read in Peking, Ayub sent feelers through Mohammed 
Ikramullah –Pakistan’s first Foreign Secretary– to the Chinese embassy in Karachi. 
Reportedly, Ikramullah told Chinese officials: ‘we don’t agree with your maps, how about 
setting them right.’ In January, 1961, Foreign Minister Qadir was heard stating that the 
Chinese were in ‘principle’ agreeable to an agreement.93          
 
Taking advantage of the informal momentum built-up by his emissaries, Ayub met with 
the Chinese ambassador in Karachi not long after he returned from the US. The PRC, it 
was made clear to Ayub, wanted a seat at the UN. Tired of its over-reliance on the Soviet 
Union, with which it was embroiled in all sorts of controversies, Zhou wanted Chinese 
envoys to make their own case at the UN free from the clutches of gatekeepers and 
antagonists alike. The timing could not have been more opportune. As one Pakistani 
official in London argued, the view in Karachi was that China was in a ‘soft mood for a 
settlement.’94 It was not that the Pakistani vote in itself mattered. Rather that it would 
help –even if ever so slightly– the PRC make its case for a Permanent Seat in the Security 
Council. Ayub once again made an offer to discuss the demarcation of Pakistan’s borders 
in the north. Of course for Ayub, these negotiations were only a means by which 
friendship with the PRC could be forged and later strengthened. Hesitant at first, the 
Chinese ambassador soon adhered. The deal was simple: Pakistan’s vote in exchange for 
a Chinese agreement to demarcate the border. In 1961 Pakistan voted in favour of the 
PRC’s admission to the UN, a task finally achieved a decade later in 1971.    
 
Shortly after Pakistan’s changed position at the UN, Pakistani officials openly stated that 
they were tasked to find a solution to their border issues with China. India was aware 
that a Pakistani delegation visited Peking to discuss the border.95 According to Qadir, 
Nehru had been shown the disputed maps by Ayub during his visit to Pakistan in 1960. 
He ‘had not seemed unduly disturbed,’ Qadir told Walter McConaughy, the US 
ambassador to Pakistan.96 In turn, Nehru made clear to John Kenneth Galbraith, the US 
envoy in New Delhi, that the deal was designed by China to simply demonstrate the 
‘unreasonableness of India.’97 In fact, Nehru got it wrong. Ayub and his envoys made it 
seem as though China was keen on the deal at this given time, when in fact it was he who 
decided the timetable for talks. The Canadian mission in Karachi picked this up, and in a 
detailed note on the border agreement distributed to all ‘friendly’ states, it underlined that 
the ‘initiative’ came from the ‘Pakistan side.’98  
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The advance, it would seem, was to make clear to both Washington and London that 
providing military assistance to India in the near future could lead to the expansion of 
what American officials liked to call Pakistan’s ‘flirtatiousness’ with China. What of 
course helped Ayub pursue this line was the US’s ‘official silence on the subject.’99 British 
Foreign Office mandarins too urged Whitehall to ‘resist any attempt’ by India to draw 
the UK into a dispute over the Sino-Pakistani border if she chose to make it one.100 
Nehru chose not to. The primary objection as far as he was concerned was that the 
territory under negotiation between Pakistan and China lay on disputed territory in 
Pakistan administered Kashmir. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs argued –and has 
done so since– that this ‘constitutes[d] an inalienable part of the Indian Union.’101 A 
protest note was sent to all parties including the UN.102 
 
With a relatively free hand, Ayub sought to maintain a carefully constructed balance 
between Pakistan’s need to remain within the western alliance whilst working to 
strengthen relations with the PRC. The outbreak of war in October 1962 and the Indian 
demand for western military assistance emboldened Ayub’s long held demand to strike a 
deal on Kashmir. That Ayub got his way with Kennedy –at least initially– and was also 
able to finalise a border agreement with China was a result of a carefully crafted 
diplomatic approach that made optimum use of the opportunity at hand: a war between 
India and China, as demonstrated in the narrative below.  
 
 
2.2. War and the Making o f  the Sino-Pakistan Border Agreement  
 
The first serious armed contact between Indian and Chinese troops took place on 10 
October 1962. Ten days later, the PLA’s campaign began in full force. Within a week of 
battle, some twenty-one Indian army posts were under Chinese occupation.103 Nehru 
requested just about every ‘friendly’ head of state for military assistance.104 Kennedy, the 
prime target of Nehru’s letters of appeal, needed little convincing. Without consulting 
Ayub, and ignoring a promise Kennedy had made to the Pakistani President in July 
1961,105 the first shipment of American-made military supplies left American shores. 
They reached the eastern city of Calcutta on 3 November 1962.  
 
What ‘personally hurt’ Ayub more was that Americans pushed Pakistan to make 
conciliatory gestures to India at a time it faced a military threat from Communist 
China.106 The Field Marshall grew almost vindictive. He rallied behind a line that had 
become all-too-common to western audiences. Indians, he wrote to Kennedy, remain 
‘hostile to Pakistan.’ An assurance that Pakistan would not threaten Indian interests ‘can 
only be done,’ he pointedly argued, ‘if there is a settlement of the question of Kashmir.’107 
A letter from Nehru guaranteeing that American-sponsored equipment ‘would not be 
used for any purpose’ other than against the Chinese did nothing for Ayub.108 Following 
the delivery of the first tranche of US military supplies to India on 3 November, Ayub 
told both American and British officials that such equipment may enlarge the conflict. 
He was convinced that China did not want to invade India. Rather, he argued that India 
was using the opportunity presented by the Chinese attack to secure military assistance 
from the west that could in turn be used against Pakistan. A national protest day against 
US aid to India was organised on 16 November 1962, to little effect.    
 
To an extent, US National Security Council staffers appreciated Pakistani anxieties. 
Robert Komer –better known for his expertise on Vietnam– argued that the Pakistani’s 
were going through a ‘genuine emotional crisis,’ in that their ‘cherished ambitions’ of 
13 
 
using the US as a ‘lever’ against India ‘was going up in the smoke of the Chinese border 
war.’109 Envoys posted in South Asia were less forgiving. Galbraith immediately 
understood what the Pakistani’s were suggesting –in their efforts to force India to discuss 
Kashmir– could be read as nothing less than a ‘form of blackmail.’ He also noted how 
Pakistani envoys did not miss a chance to ‘make pro-Chinese noises.’110 Furthermore, 
Pakistan and China entered formal negotiations on 12 October. Ayub’s advance, as 
outlined above, might not have pleased the likes of Galbraith, but it was beginning to 
yield results. In fact, the negotiations themselves were kept secret. For instance, on 25 
October, Duncan Sandys –the British Commonwealth Secretary– met with Bogra. The 
latter fervently argued that ‘Chinese aggression against India constituted a common 
threat to the whole subcontinent.’111 The parallel track advance of keeping Britain and the 
US onside whilst quietly engaging China was in the works.   
 
On 21 November, the PRC announced a unilateral ceasefire. By 1 December, the PLA 
consolidated its occupation of the Aksai Chin in Indian administered Kashmir. Its forces 
moved twenty kilometres behind the McMahon Line or the disputed border between 
India’s North Eastern region and Tibet. Throughout the conflict Ayub unhesitatingly 
argued that the primary Chinese aim was to take ‘control of the Sinkiang road and a 
certain part of Ladakh,’ which lay in the Aksai Chin area.112 He reiterated this to Sandy’s 
and Averell Harriman –the American Ambassador to the UN– during their nine-day visit 
to India and Pakistan in November 1962. Immediately after the ceasefire was called, 
Foreign Minister Bogra did not miss the chance to tell McConaughy that although 
Pakistan and China were like ‘oil and water,’ there was ‘some natural advantage’ in 
engaging Beijing.113  
 
Veiled threats like these served as a convincer for the Anglo-American team already 
determined to find a way to balance India’s need for further military assistance with 
Ayub’s demands for talks. Nehru hesitatingly agreed. Six rounds of talks on Kashmir 
were to begin on 26 December. What of course McConaughy, Sandy’s, Harriman, and 
Galbraith did not know was that Pakistan had entered into official dialogue with China 
just as Indian positions were being overrun by the PLA. Following the Chinese call for a 
ceasefire, and whilst Sandy’s pressed Bogra about Pakistan’s dealings with China, the 
Pakistani foreign minister kept-up the twin track advance developed by Ayub. He 
‘laughed’ and said ‘there is no foundation whatsoever for this rumour,’114 all the while 
talking quietly with the Chinese. By the third week of December both Pakistan and China 
had reached an agreement. The Indian delegation to the first round of talks in 
Rawalpindi in December 1962 –led by the Indian Railways Minister Sardar Swaran Singh 
–learnt of the border agreement on Karachi radio on the evening of their arrival. 
Nothing could have shocked the Indians more.115 Galbraith and the US State department 
too were caught off guard. ‘History can be idiotic,’ Galbraith wrote in his journal. ‘A 
staunch American ally against Communism,’ he argued, ‘is negotiating with the Chinese 
Communists to the discontent of an erstwhile neutral.’116 The Americans had no idea 
about the advanced stage of Sino-Pakistani negotiations.  
 
The irony escaped no one. Not the least Swaran Singh, who realised that even under 
these dire and potentially embarrassing circumstances, the talks with Ayub’s envoys –led 
by Bhutto– were a necessity if India wanted arms from abroad. Singh, British officials 
argued was ‘anxious to make a serious attempt to negotiate.’117 Years later, Bhutto told 
Paul Gore-Booth –the British High Commissioner in New Delhi during the Border War 
– that the decision to go public with the Chinese deal was taken to test India’s 
earnestness to talk about Kashmir and also place adequate pressure on Kennedy.118 
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Bhutto got his answer, and to his credit, did his part –at least during the first two 
rounds– to take the dialogue process as seriously as possible.119 What he of course did 
not tell western diplomats like Gore-Booth was that the decision to go public on the deal 
with China was potentially a part of a strategy designed and directed by Ayub. In fact, 
Ayub wasted no time whatsoever. He received the news from his envoy that an 
agreement in principle had been settled in Peking at 8.30 pm on 26 December.120 Karachi 
radio carried the headline at 9.00 pm.121  
 
2.3. The Sino-Pakistan Border Agreement  
 
In a five-page document containing seven articles, both sides agreed to ‘formally delimit 
and demarcate the boundary between China’s Sinkiang and the contiguous areas.’122 As 
mentioned above, the signatures were exchanged a fortnight before the fourth round of 
talks between India and Pakistan were to proceed. British officials tried hard to convince 
Bhutto to forgo the visit to Peking to sign the agreement. It would have a ‘very bad 
effect on the current’ negotiation with India they stated.123 In Washington, Pakistani 
ambassador Aziz Ahmed forcefully argued that his Ministry of Foreign Affairs ‘tried to 
call off the Bhutto visit but could not.’124 Clearly, Bhutto was not proceeding in 
accordance with Ministry-led imperatives, but a carefully crafted timetable set by Ayub 
and potentially himself.125 To be sure, the last leg of the Sino-Pakistani negotiations took 
place mainly in Peking and was led by Ayub’s trusted ambassador – Nawabzada Raza,126 
and not the erstwhile Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir as claimed by some.127 In his 
autobiography, Altaf Gauhar confirms that ‘Ayub was playing a lone hand.’ His cabinet 
was ‘divided,’ which would explain the sequence of events highlighted immediately 
above.128 This is largely confirmed by Booth’s own account of the negotiations.129  
 
The third and fourth round of the India-Pakistan talks in Karachi and Calcutta lasted 
only for a day-and-a-half each. Obsessed with Pakistani control over the Kashmir Valley, 
Bhutto disregarded any suggestion by the Indian team of accepting amendments along 
the Ceasefire Line (CFL) between Indian and Pakistan administered Kashmir. This, even 
when the Indian side was prepared to offer Pakistan 1,500 square miles of territory more 
than Pakistan had at the time.130 The view in Karachi was shaped by an ‘increasing feeling 
of scepticism,’131 as British diplomats reported back to Whitehall. What helped fuel this 
sense of doubt in February 1963 was the fact that the temporary ban on sending arms 
and ammunition to India had been lifted.132 Clearly, the idea that supplies were 
dependent upon India’s willingness to negotiate a deal on Kashmir now mattered less to 
both Britain and America. In fact, following the first two rounds, Bhutto understood that 
India would not concede either the Kashmir Valley or even a part of it. This was a key 
Pakistani demand. Anything short of the Valley or large portions of it, Bhutto reasoned, 
would not be acceptable to either the National Assembly or the Pakistani public.133 
 
It is at this time that the decision seemed to have been taken to bring forward the signing 
–of the Sino-Pakistani border agreement– to March. If western military aid was to be 
given to India despite the continued deadlock on Kashmir, an agreement with China was 
thought to open alternative options that would more directly support Pakistani interests. 
Interestingly, and whilst both Kennedy and Macmillan were under the impression that 
Zhou was responsible for sabotaging the talks on Kashmir, in fact, according to Pakistani 
insiders, the ‘Chinese government wanted to move slowly.’134 It was Ayub and Bhutto 
who chose to make the best of the opportunity at hand. They largely ignored the more 
cautious approach developed earlier by Bogra and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs more 
generally. The bureaucrats were largely kept in the dark. As mentioned above, the 
15 
 
Pakistani ambassador to Peking – a political appointee, and not the Foreign Secretary, 
concluded the agreement. It was shared with the Ministry only as a matter of protocol 
after it had been completed.135  
Macmillan told Kennedy that he was aware of the ‘continual dangers in Ayub’s flirting 
with the Chinese,’ but that there was little he or the US President could do to ‘abandon’ 
the agreement.136 Shortly after the treaty was finally signed, Kennedy made clear to 
Nehru that he could not ‘remake the past.’137 The Sino-Pakistani deal was a reality, which, 
in US Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s’ estimation limited the US’s ‘leverage with the 
Indian’s.’138 Rusk was right. Nehru well understood that the US could no longer pretend 
to be backing the demands of what turned out to be an insincere ally: Pakistan. In turn, 
Ayub was clear that Nehru was unwilling to budge when it came to the Valley. The 
fourth, fifth, and sixth rounds of the India-Pakistan talks finally ended on 16 May having 
made no headway whatsoever.139  
 
The Sino-Pakistani agreement itself was hardly earth shattering. The Chinese-claim line 
fell within parts of the former princely states of Hunza and Nagar, which acceded to 
Pakistan in 1947-48. It abutted Sinkiang to the north and the Wakhan Corridor to its 
west. A second area, Gilgit and Baltistan or what is known as the Northern Areas in the 
present time bordered Sinkiang to the north and Tibet to the east and were directly 
administered by Pakistan through two political agents. In the end, both Pakistan and 
China agreed to an Actual Line of Control based on the Karakoram watershed. Upon 
Pakistan’s request, Zhou conceded an area known as the Oprang Valley in Hunza, which 
was used by the people of Hunza for grazing. This was not Pakistani territory, and the 
Chinese agreed to withdraw from it. In the end, China received 2050 square miles and 
Pakistan was left with 1,350 square miles. Apart from the Oprang, other areas negotiated 
away were considered to be ‘inaccessible from the Pakistani side.’140 In the end, once 
provided with the agreement, Pakistani bureaucrats – like Agha Shahi, the Director 
General in the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs was content with the agreement.141  
 
The agreement even took into cognizance the fact that an Indian protest would follow. 
As mentioned above, India’s principle and immediate objection was that the territory 
ceded to China included parts of Pakistan administered Kashmir. This was disputed 
territory; Indian officials reasoned, and could not be bartered away. Hence, Nawabzada 
and his Chinese interlocutors made room for an Article –Six– that made clear that 
following the ‘settlement of the Kashmir dispute’ China would reopen negotiations with 
the ‘sovereign authority concerned.’142 In many ways, not only did the timing of the 
negotiations work well for Ayub, but the final outcome was more than acceptable to 
Pakistan. It would be highly unlikely, Ayub understood, that India and Pakistan would be 
able settle their differences hence leaving the agreement with the PRC intact.  
 
In the end, the negotiations leading up to the agreement and the final treaty laid the 
foundation of a friendship like none other for both Pakistan and China. This is not to 
say, as the following and last section of this articles underscores, that the relationship 
forged in 1963 has always yielded results in the way Pakistan would have liked, but in 
some form and shape remains a key guarantee against both India and the west’s 
oscillatory policies. In fact, soon after the treaty was signed, the previously cautious 
Pakistani policy towards China, apparent in the period between 1949 and 1960, changed. 
In a survey of Pakistani foreign office officials and air force officers conducted in 1965 
by Alistair Buchan – the founding director of what was then the Institute of Strategic 
Studies in London, Pakistan’s once watchful position towards China was replaced with 
blanket admiration. The view from Islamabad and Rawalpindi was clear, reported 
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Buchan, ‘China is not a threat to her neighbours. … She is a prudent country with certain 
legitimate requirements of coexistence but without an expansionist philosophy despite 
her ideological fervour.’143  
 
3. Conclusion: Friendship in Times of War and Peace  
 
According to a survey conducted in 2014, China had a ‘favourability’ rating within 
Pakistan of 78 percent, higher than any other country in Asia and twenty-seven points 
higher than the US.144 From the outset, the poll made clear that Buchan’s estimation in 
1965 stood the test of time. Admittedly, surveys and polls are at best indicative of 
popular sentiment of those polled. Indeed, in the fifty-odd years since the Sino-Pakistani 
Border agreement was signed, Chinese support for Pakistan and the ‘all weather 
friendship’ has been less than clear-cut. Yet, and without doubt, as the author of a recent 
book on Sino-Pakistani relations contends, friendship is ‘the one commodity that 
Pakistan can offer China more convincingly than any other country.’145As this concluding 
section underlines, while China has refused to provide military and even political support 
for Pakistan in times of war with India, it has in fact been a friend to Pakistan in a way 
that more-than-matters to Pakistani elites. The quick shift in Chinese positions in times 
of war between India and Pakistan in the last half-century illustrates the limitations of 
this friendship. Equally, Beijing’s support in times of peace makes clear the importance 
of a friendship that neither India nor the US can ignore or even underestimate. In the 
final analysis, the benefits of the ‘all weather friendship’ are without doubt.  
 
On 5 August 1965, Pakistani regular soldiers dressed like mujahedeen fighters crossed 
the CFL that divides Indian and Pakistani administered Kashmir. It was the beginning of 
a clandestine Operation known as Gibraltar. The idea was simple: to encourage those in 
Indian administered Kashmir to revolt against the local government and call for 
independence. The plot was quickly foiled.146 Within a week, Indian security and 
intelligence officials were able to successfully arrest Pakistani regulars disguised as 
mujahedeen fighters. The fighting escalated with regular Pakistani troops manoeuvring to 
cut-off parts of Indian administered Kashmir. On 6 September, the Indian army crossed 
the International Border, opening a second front. As Indian regiments moved close to 
Lahore in Pakistani Punjab, Ayub reached-out to China for help. In fact, according to 
John Garver, Chinese leaders were ‘consulted extensively’ during the planning stages of 
Operation Gibraltar. Days before India opened the second front, the Chinese Foreign 
Minister –during a brief visit to Karachi– stated that China ‘firmly supports Pakistan’s 
just action in hitting back at armed Indian provocation.’ A few days later the Pakistani 
ambassador in Peking was categorically told that if India entered East Pakistan, then 
China would seek to militarily intervene. With the view to place pressure on the Indian 
government and military forces, Zhou authored a note on 19 September warning India 
that it must dismantled its military infrastructure in the eastern border with Tibet, 
otherwise ‘bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences arising therefrom.’147  
 
The administration of US President Lyndon B. Johnson was convinced that the Chinese 
threat made to India was real. In fact, following Kennedy’s funeral in 1963 Johnson 
reluctantly met with Bhutto –who was sent by Ayub to represent Pakistan– and warned 
the Foreign Minister that Pakistan’s advance with China would not be tolerated in 
Washington. Officials like Undersecretary of State George Ball told the President that he 
‘deeply distrusted’ Bhutto. He had, as Kux recounts, ‘persistently undercut’ US interests 
according to Ball.148 In 1965 however, the benefits of Pakistan’s ‘flirtatiousness’ with 
China was more-than-clear to both Bhutto and Ayub. Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur 
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Shastri –who took office following Nehru’s demise in 1964– confessed to the American 
ambassador in India –Chester Bowles– that ‘these thoughts [around the Chinese threat] 
were very much on his mind’ as he discussed plans to evict the Pakistani army from 
Indian administered Kashmir.149 So convincing was the Chinese threat in support of 
Pakistan that in the midst of the crisis, Robert Komer pointedly told Johnson that the 
PLA’s involvement would mean that the ‘whole Western power position in Asia may be 
at risk.’ The support to Pakistan from the likes of Zhou was ‘firm,’ according to Komer. 
It was for these reasons, he argued, that the US would need to work with the USSR to 
force an UN-backed ceasefire as soon as possible.150 On 22 September, India accepted 
such a proposal. The war ended. For his part, Ayub did not fail to tell his people that ‘the 
moral support which the Chinese government extended to us [Pakistan]…will forever 
remain enshrined in our hearts.’151 The ‘all weather friendship’ had clearly paid-off, 
especially at a time when the Johnson administration was almost fully occupied with an 
impending war in Vietnam.152 This is not to over-estimate the role played by China 
during the war, but to simply make the point that the ‘friendship’ did place significant 
pressure on the US. Further, it made clear to India that there were limits to what the 
Indian army could do inside Pakistan and in Pakistan administered Kashmir. This was 
clearly an important factor for no less a figure than the Indian Prime Minister.  
 
Yet, that such support was so readily available in 1965 was not something that could be 
taken for granted. Ayub’s successor –Yahya Khan– learnt this bitter lesson during the 
1971 War. The war led to the loss of East Pakistan and the creation of the independent 
state of Bangladesh. The fight for linguistic and economic rights amongst the majority 
Bangla speaking population in East Pakistan can be traced to the early 1950s. By 1969, a 
six-point plan for greater autonomy had ben submitted by the Awami League to West 
Pakistani elites. The Awami’s victory in the 1970 General Election was not only 
surprising, but also unacceptable to those like Bhutto – who had launched his own party 
in the west. The inability to find a political solution on the part of Yahya, Bhutto, and the 
Awami leadership let to a crackdown in the East forcing many Awami leaders into India. 
Moreover, by August 1971, close to ten million East-Pakistani refugees were living in 
India’s less stable North Eastern regions. For Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, it 
was clear that something needed to be done. The failure of diplomatic efforts and the 
difficulty in mobilising world opinion ultimately led to war. For the Nixon 
administration, Yahya, as is well known, was a key actor who helped broker Henry 
Kissinger’s secret visit to China in the summer of 1971.153 Supporting Yahya was seen as 
prudent policy for both Nixon and Kissinger.154 This notwithstanding, the Nixon White 
House could do little more than strongly critique Gandhi’s decision to invade East 
Pakistan. Only when it looked like India might escalate the War in the western frontier 
across Kashmir did the US send parts of the seventh fleet as a warning to New Delhi.155 
 
For Pakistan, active Chinese military support was of paramount importance. The hope 
was that much like in 1965, Zhou and Mao might mobilise the PLA and thereby place 
Indian troops on alert and hence divide Indian forces in the Eastern frontier. Such 
support, Yahya’s envoys realised was unavailable. During a visit to Beijing on 5 
November 1971, a month before war broke-out, Bhutto and Foreign Secretary Sultan 
Khan had met with Zhou. Unlike in 1965, the Chinese Premier was reserved. India was 
well armed and better equipped than in 1965. Most passes into Eastern India were 
inaccessible in the winter months, making Chinese manoeuvres all the more difficult. 
Further, there was little political appetite to threaten war with India over an issue that 
was largely of Pakistan’s making. Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei had long asked Yahya to 
find a ‘reasonable settlement’ in the East. Lastly, an Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship – 
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signed on 9 August 1971– served, as something of a deterrent to China should the 
Soviet’s chose to militarily support India.156 At the end of Bhutto’s trip, he argued that 
‘Pakistan can hope for little from China.’157 For Pakistan, it was clear that Chinese 
support was conditional. China did provide much needed military equipment to Pakistan 
at a time that US supplies were largely lacking, but there was a line that had been drawn 
by Chinese leaders of how far they would go to assist their ‘all weather’ friend.’158 
Further, the only guarantee hazily provided by Pakistan’s friends, the US and China was 
that they would potentially intervene if Indian forces crossed the border into West 
Pakistan. However, for Gandhi, this was never a part of the plan as attested by notes 
written by her following the war.159 
 
Nearly three decades later in 1999, the government of Nawaz Sharif better understood 
the limitations of Chinese support. He was more taken aback by the single condition 
imposed on him by President Bill Clinton: to withdraw his forces from Indian 
administered Kashmir. Following a well-planned incursion in an area known as Kargil in 
Indian administered Kashmir, Indian armed forces were mobilised. The objective was to 
vacate Pakistani regulars –dressed, much like in 1965, as mujahedeen fighters– from key 
points that had been left vacant by the Indian army in the winter months. In fact, 
vacating such territories was a custom followed by both armies, one that had been 
cunningly betrayed by the new Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf. 
Unlike in the past, this ‘limited war,’ as it is popularly referred to, was fought in the 
backdrop of the existence of nuclear weapons. Clinton and his close advisors intervened 
almost immediately. Pakistan, as far as the US president was concerned was on the 
wrong, and he made this clear to Sharif during a visit to Washington on 5 July 1999. 
Equally, Beijing had made clear to Musharraf that Chinese military and even political 
support was out of the question. Pakistan was on it’s own. In the end, US diplomatic 
pressure persuaded Sharif and then Musharraf to withdraw their forces, but not before 
the Indian army had managed to take back the occupied positions.160 For Brajesh Misra, 
India’s National Security Advisor, it was clear that Chinese interference was less likely. 
Only if the Indian army decided to follow suite and enter Pakistan administered Kashmir, 
he argued, would the Indians have to worry about China. This, however, was far from 
India’s calculations in 1999.161 American support for India during the Kargil War was 
unprecedented. A US President had clearly condemned Pakistani actions. It was a time 
that Pakistan and especially Musharraf needed China the most.  
 
The two episodes in 1971 and 1999 clarify that for China, direct military involvement in 
an India-Pakistan standoff is highly unlikely. However, and as both Gandhi and Misra 
understood, Chinese reactions in the event where India takes military initiative in 
Pakistan administered Kashmir is hardly clear-cut. Further, the advantages of the ‘all 
weather friendship’ are clearer in peacetime. China has consistently played a central role 
in helping Pakistan grow its nuclear arsenal and military industrial complex. Following 
the withdrawal of US-led forces from Afghanistan in 2014 and the end of large amounts 
of military and economic assistance to Pakistan, China stepped-in. It invested close to 
$46 billion in what is widely known as the China-Pakistan-Economic-Corridor or CPEC. 
Further, and as importantly, China has actively blocked India’s application to become a 
full member of the Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG), unless Pakistan is also made a full 
member. It has also used its veto effectively to disallow terrorists wanted by India –but 
who live in Pakistan and direct attacks against India– to be placed on the UN’s sanctions 
list.162  
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It would be a mistake to assume that non-intervention in past and perhaps future wars 
undermines the importance of this unique friendship. The fruits of Ayub, Bhutto, Bogra 
and Suhrawardy’s labour are more than clear in the present. Pakistan’s triangular 
diplomacy with both China and the US might not have always worked in it’s favour –as 
was abundantly clear in 1971 and 1999, but, it has still been able to rely on China on 
matters that are as crucial for Pakistan’s economy and security interests. As Misra argued, 
‘Chinese calculations cannot be underestimated when it comes to dealing with 
Pakistan.’163 That these calculations place certain limits on Indian diplomacy, even if not 
on military action, provides a degree of leverage that is crucial in Pakistan’s advance in 
the present. This is especially moot given the souring of relations between Pakistan and 
the US during President Barack Obama’s final years in office.164 The fact that Pakistan 
has options apart from the US was made possible because of the wisdom and cunning of 
its leaders who in the 1950s and early 1960s took advantage of opportunities –such as the 
1962 Sino-Indian War– as they presented themselves. This article provides a more 
complete account of their story; one that began only months after the PRC came into 
being in October 1949.  
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